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axpayers in California recently found themselves the target of a 
retroactive grab for revenue by the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) in 
what has called an act of “lawless taxation” by the state of California.1  The 
source of the conflict was the Qualified Small Business Stock credit that had 
been in place in California since 1993.2  The tax credit, which was designed 
                                                
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Taxation, and Financial Planning, Bentley University.  
B.S. Wagner College; J.D. Harvard Law School.  The author is grateful for the assistance of 
Jonathan Darrow and Cheryl Kirschner. 
 1. Lawless Taxation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2013, at 12.  
 2. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18152.5 (2014). 
T 
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to encourage innovation and investment in California-based enterprises, 
allowed business owners who had at least eighty percent of their assets and 
employees in California to take a credit of fifty percent of the capital gain 
realized on a sale of their stock.3  In August 2012, the California Court of 
Appeals ruled that the credit was discriminatory against out-of-state 
taxpayers in violation of the Commerce Clause.4  As a result of this ruling, 
the FTB made an announcement in December 2012 that it would soon be 
sending tax bills to all business owners who had claimed the tax credit since 
2008, seeking the taxes that would have been due plus corresponding 
interest.5  The move was expected to bring an additional $120 million in 
revenue to the state straight from the pockets of taxpayers who had lawfully 
relied on a credit that had been in place for twenty years.6 
This revenue grab by the FTB invoked the ire of taxpayers and 
lawmakers alike.  In response to pressure from California Governor Jerry 
Brown, the FTB announced in February 2013 that it would temporarily 
refrain from collecting the back taxes.7  State lawmakers, in a bipartisan 
effort, immediately proposed legislation to curtail this action by the FTB.  
These legislative proposals, Assembly Bill 14128 and Senate Bill 209,9 were 
sent to Governor Brown on September 20, 2013 and signed into law on 
October 4, 2013, ensuring that the FTB could not seek retroactive taxes along 
with corresponding penalties from affected taxpayers.10 
 Absent action by the California state legislature in this instance, would it 
have been lawful for the FTB to retroactively collect payments from 
taxpayers who relied on the long-standing credit?  Was this really an act of 
“lawless taxation?”  This Article concludes that the actions of the FTB were 
in fact lawful, and indicative of a growing trend of retroactive taxing 
measures that have gained acceptance in the United States in recent years, 
especially as states scurry to find ways to maintain balanced budgets.   
                                                
 3. Id. 
 4. See Cutler v. Franchise Tax Bd., 208 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1261 (2012). 
 5. Ann Hodges, FTB Notice 2012-03, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. (Dec. 21, 2012), 
available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/notices/2012/2012_03.pdf. 
 6. John Tozzi, California Seeks $120 Million in Back Taxes from Small Businesses, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-
06/california-seeks-120-million-in-back-taxes-from-small-business. 
 7. Qualified Small Business Stock (QSBS) Gains – FAQs (Feb. 28, 2013), 
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/Qualified_Small_Business_Stock_and_Cutler_Decision.shtml 
(explaining the taxpayer’s right to request that the QSBS assessment be held pending 
legislative action). 
 8. A.B. 1412 (Stats. 2013, ch. 546) (Cal. 2013). 
 9. S.B. 209 (Stats. 2013, ch. 546) (Cal. 2013). 
 10. See Sen. Ted W. Lieu, Governor Brown Signs Lieu-Backed Bill to End Retroactive Tax 
on State Entrepreneurs (Oct. 4, 2013), http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-10-04-gov-brown-
signs-sen-lieu-backed-bill-end-retroactive-tax-state-entrepreneurs (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
2014 LAWLESS TAXATION  221 
 
This Article considers the extent to which the legal system condones 
retroactive actions taken against taxpayers.  Part I opens with a look at recent 
retroactive actions in California.  Part II provides an introduction to 
retroactive laws.  Part III then takes a closer look at the constitutionality of 
retroactive actions, with an emphasis on due process concerns.  Part IV 
focuses that discussion specifically on retroactive tax actions, providing both 
historical insight and a discussion of more recent cases.  Having 
demonstrated that federal constitutional safeguards and common law have 
done little in recent years to protect taxpayers from retroactive tax actions, 
this Article concludes that rather than being an outlier, California is in fact 
representative of a growing trend, and that neither Congress nor the judiciary 
can be expected to stem the tide of retroactive revenue grabs anytime soon. 
 
I.   RETROACTIVE REACHES IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Two California cases illustrate the extent to which the state has utilized 
retroactivity as a means of limiting its potential liability to pay taxpayer 
refund claims.  The first case, Northwest Energetic Services v. California 
Franchise Tax Board,11 considered the constitutionality of California’s LLC 
fee, which imposed a levy on the total worldwide gross receipts of an LLC 
even if the LLC was a nonresident business with revenue from both inside 
and outside of the state.12  Constitutionally, this fee should have been limited 
to the portion of gross receipts allocated to California.13  As taxpayers 
commenced legal challenges against the fee in court, local legislators became 
concerned about the extent of potential refund claims to which the state 
would be exposed if the court were to invalidate the fee.  To curb the state’s 
liability, the Assembly passed Assembly Bill 1614, which was designed to 
limit the refunds to which taxpayers would be entitled in the event that the 
court found the gross receipts fee to be unconstitutional.14  In order to limit 
possible refund claims, the legislature also made changes to the LLC fee 




                                                
 11. 159 Cal. App. 4th 841 (2008). 
 12. Id. at 849–50; see also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17942 (2014). 
 13. Northwest, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 861–62 (“For decades, state statutes that impose taxes 
on income earned outside the state's jurisdiction, or that fail to apportion total income in 
accordance with the income earned within the jurisdiction, have been held to violate the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
 14. A.B. 1614 (Stats. 1998, ch. 351) (Cal. 2013). 
 15. Id. 
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was passed in the late hours of the last day of the legislative session16 and so 
has been referred to as a “midnight special.”17 
Whether such a long retroactivity period would pass constitutional 
muster was never determined because Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
refused to sign the legislation into law.18  The following year, the state passed 
Assembly Bill 198, which added Section 19394 to the Revenue and Taxation 
Code, in part, due to concern about the outcome of the cases challenging the 
calculation of the LLC fee.19  This legislation limited the amount of potential 
refund claims that LLCs could file.20  Ultimately, the California Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the San Francisco trial court that the LLC 
fee calculation method was unconstitutional and provided that the remedy 
should be a refund of all taxes paid under the Act.21  But the FTB, relying on 
the newly enacted legislation, refused to issue full refunds to the out-of-state 
LLCs.22  Instead, the FTB limited the refund to the “amount by which the fee 
paid plus any interest assessed exceeds the amount of the fee that would have 
been assessed” pursuant to the new fee structure.23  As a result, what should 
have been total refund claims of $1.3 billion has cost the state only $280 
million.24 
 The more recent case of Gillette v. Franchise Tax Board,25 currently 
pending before the California Supreme Court, also showcases the 
government’s instinct to take retroactive action as a means of minimizing 
state monetary obligations.  California had been a member of the Multistate 
Tax Compact since 1974.26  As part of this Compact, member states agree to 
provide taxpayers with the option of using either the state’s own 
apportionment formula for apportioning income or the three-factor of equal 
weight (property, payroll, and sales) formula provided for in the Uniform 
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).27  In 1993, California 
switched from a three-factor apportionment formula to a sales, property, and 
                                                
 16. Frank Russo, California Assembly Adjourns After Midnight, CAL. PROGRESS REP. 
(Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/print/6635. 
 17. See, e.g., Kathleen K. Wright, Using Retroactive Taxes to Cure Budget Shortfalls, 61 
TAX L. 1153, 1154 (2008). 
 18. See Peter Kanter, California's LLC Tax: Current Litigation and Retroactive 
Legislation, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.mofo.com/Californias-
LLC-Tax-Current-Litigation-and-Retroactive-Legislation/. 
 19. A.B. 198 (Stats. 2007, ch. 381) (Cal. 2013). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Northwest, 159 Cal App. 4th at 868. 
 22. See KATHLEEN K. WRIGHT, CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX MANUAL 286 (2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Wright, supra note 17, at 1153. 
 25. 209 Cal. App. 4th 938 (2012). 
 26. Id. at 946. 
 27. 3 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 38001 (2006). 
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payroll factor formula that double-weighted the sales factor.28  This revised 
language provided that, “Nothwithstanding Section 38006 [(the Compact)], 
all business income shall be apportioned to this state by” the double-
weighted sales method.29  The FTB considered the adoption of this language 
to be sufficient to negate the Compact.30  In 2010, the Gillette Company and 
its subsidiaries brought legal action against the FTB, alleging that taxpayers 
had the right for all periods since 1993 to continue to opt to use the 
Compact’s apportionment formula because California had not withdrawn 
from the Compact.31  The Court of Appeals agreed with Gillette, resulting in 
the current, pending appeal to the California Supreme Court.32  In 2012, 
concerned that a decision by the California high court in favor of the 
taxpayers could result in significant refund claims, the California legislature 
passed Senate Bill 1015 to curtail taxpayer refunds by limiting the ability of a 
taxpayer to file an amended return using the Compact apportionment 
formula.33  The legislation states that a taxpayer cannot elect the Compact’s 
apportionment methodology on an amended return; rather, this election could 
only be made on a taxpayer’s originally filed return, thus retroactively 
limiting the taxpayer’s use of the Compact.34 
The various retroactive reaches in California, while troubling, are not 
outliers.  In fact, for reasons explained in the remainder of this Article, it is 
likely that such retroactive actions can withstand legal scrutiny. 
 
II.   UNDERSTANDING RETROACTIVE ACTIONS 
 
To fully appreciate the extent to which the current trend of retroactive tax 
actions pass constitutional muster, a useful starting point is a broader look at 
the nature of retroactive actions and the constitutional limits of such 
behavior. 
 
A. What Is Retroactive Law? 
 
Retroactive laws are those that “apply to prior acts, events, or 
occurrences, and seek to impose new consequences on such past conduct.”35  
A retroactive law “relates back to and gives a previous transaction a legal 
                                                
 28. Gillette, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 944. 
 29. Id. at 949. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 949–50. 
 32. Id. at 960. 
 33. S.B. 1015 (Stats. 2012, ch. 37) (Cal. 2012). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Andrew C. Weiler, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial Rubberstamping of 
Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1076 n.27 (1993). 
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effect different from that which it had under the law in effect when it 
transpired.”36 In Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,37 
Justice Story interpreted Article 23 of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights, 
which declares that “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and 
unjust.  No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of 
civil causes, or the punishment of offenses.”38  Justice Story explained that 
the term applies not only to statutes which take effect prior to their time of 
passage, but to all rules which affect vested rights and past transactions.39 
 
B. The Natural Aversion to Retroactive Actions 
 
There is an inherent unfairness in allowing the government to “change 
the rules of the game” midstream.  As early as 1788 in our nation’s history, 
James Madison observed that, “The sober people of America are weary of 
the fluctuating policy that has directed the public councils.”40  In short, the 
people were indignant of sudden changes in the law and legislative 
interferences.41  Justice Story admonished that “Retrospective laws are, 
indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with 
sound legislation, nor with the fundamental principles of the social 
compact.”42  Even the English common law shares this aversion to 
retroactivity, as recognized in an 1811 decision in which the court found that, 
“It is a principle in the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that 
a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective 
effect.”43  A hundred years later, this notion still had broad support, as 
evidenced by the following excerpt from a 1911 treatise: 
 
Retrospective laws are . . . of questionable policy, and 
contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the 
conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought to deal with 
future acts, and ought not to change the character of past 




                                                
 36. R & P Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 541 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. 1958). 
 37. 22 F. Cas. 756 (N.H. 1814).  
 38. N.H. CONST. art. XXIII. 
 39. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767.  
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 42. 2 JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1398 (5th ed. 1891). 
 43. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. 1811). 
 44. HERBERT BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 24 (8th ed. 1911). 
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Individuals should be able to plan their conduct in accordance with 
known legal standards.45  In addition, courts have traditionally opposed 
retroactive laws because they create instability and can be used either to 
benefit or to harm selected classes of citizens.46  But this early indignation 
began to erode and retroactive actions soon gained traction and acceptance in 
the legal system.  As Robert DeGaudenzi has pointed out, “Notwithstanding 
this long tradition of judicial aversion for retroactive legislation, laws having 
retrospective effect are regularly enacted and upheld.”47  
 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
 
While it may seem intuitive that reliance on the law should be protected, 
the Constitution makes no such guarantee.  “And yet nothing seems more 
basic to the existence of a legal order than the ability to rely upon the actions 
of others, including the government, with some assurance.”48 
 
A. Retroactivity and the Constitution 
 
The Constitution does not contain a blanket prohibition against all types 
of retroactive actions by the government, but it does impose some 
limitations.  For example, government must not take any action that would 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that 
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”49  The Constitution also expressly prohibits ex post facto 
laws.50  The Contract Clause, which prevents laws impairing contract 
obligations, states that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”51  Lastly, the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which prohibits the government taking of private property “for  
 
 
                                                
 45. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive 
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960). 
 46. Id. at 693.  
 47. Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Death Is Still Certain, But Are Taxes?: An Examination of the 
Due Process Limitations on Retroactive Tax Legislation After Carlton v. United States, 67 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 327, 327 n.1 (1993). 
 48. W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive 
Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216, 225 (1960). 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 50. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (applicable to the federal government); id. § 10, cl. 1 (applicable to 
the States). 
 51. Id. art. I, § 10. 
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public use without just compensation,”52 has also been used to limit the 
government’s taking of property rights.53  
There are numerous reasons such constitutional safeguards exist.  As one 
commentator explained: 
 
Citizens should be able to plan their conduct with reasonable 
certainty of the legal consequences.  There is a public need 
for stability with respect to past transactions.  Retroactive 
laws may be passed with exact knowledge of who the law 
will benefit or harm, which increases the potential for 
corruption in the political process.54 
 
What standard should courts apply when analyzing the constitutionality 
of retroactive lawmaking?  The question is not an easy one and, over time, 
the manner in which it has been answered has evolved.  As James Huffman 
points out, one thing is clear: 
 
If every change in the law with a negative impact for 
someone were invalid because retroactive, government 
would indeed cease to function.  But the measure of 
unconstitutional retroactivity cannot be the mere coincidence 
of detriment.  A more sophisticated and discerning standard 
is required.55   
 
This Article explores the limits of that standard as it has developed over time. 
 
B. Due Process Concerns 
 
The Due Process Clause,56 the prohibition on ex post facto laws,57 the 
Takings Clause,58 and the Contracts Clause59 have all been invoked as a 
                                                
  52. Id. amend. V. 
 53. See Stewart Haskins, Gambling with the IRS: Enforcement of Retroactive Tax Statutes 
in United States v. Carlton, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1163 (1996). 
 54. Id. at 1165. 
 55. James L. Huffman, Retroactivity, The Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 51 ALA. L. 
REV. 1095, 1116 (2000). 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 57. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (applicable to the federal government); id. § 10, cl. 1 (applicable to 
the States).  Although the Constitution expressly forbids ex post facto laws, a 1798 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision determined that this prohibition only applied to criminal, not civil, 
law.  See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).  For a more thorough treatment of ex post facto 
laws, see Steve Selinger, The Case Against Civil Ex Post Facto Laws, 15 CATO J. 191 (1995). 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Application of the Takings Clause requires that there first be a 
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defense against retroactive government actions.  As will be described more 
fully in Part IV, the current leading Supreme Court case on retroactive tax 
actions focuses on whether there has been a Due Process violation.60  Thus, 
Part III limits its focus to Due Process concerns. 
 
1.  Early Due Process Cases 
 
Law students and practitioners alike crave “bright-line” tests in the law.  
Such tests offer exactitude and clarity.  However, such bright-line tests are 
few and far between.  In the application of the Due Process Clause to 
retroactive actions, a once bright-line aversion to retroactive government 
action soon gave way to an ever-evolving balancing test that one must cobble 
together from sometimes conflicting court decisions. 
   The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
ensure that the federal and state governments do not deprive any person of 
“life, liberty, and property without due process of law.61  “[I]n the nineteenth 
century, courts regarded retroactive legislation . . . as, by definition, failing to 
provide adequate notice, and thus the ‘process’ that was ‘due.’  Neither the 
strength of the government’s interest nor the scope of the regulation was 
relevant.”62  For example, in an early case,63 the Court determined the 
revocation of a war risk insurance contract was unconstitutional when 
applied to outstanding policies.64  However, it was not long before the Court 
started to move away from this approach and adopt a more lenient 
acceptance of retroactivity in the area of economic legislation. 
                                                                                                               
property right.  In County of Mobile v. Kimble, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880), the U.S. Supreme 
Court acknowledged that taxation is distinct from the “taking” of property.  A more recent 
decision confirms this result.  See Quarty v. United States, 170 F. 3d. 961 (9th Cir. 1999).  For 
a more thorough treatment of the Takings Clause, see Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, 
Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015 (2006). 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  Prior to the Great Depression, it was not uncommon for the 
Supreme Court to rely on the Contracts Clause as a means of limiting state government 
authority.  For a more thorough treatment of this issue, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 625 (3d ed. 2006).  The New Deal Era cases 
changed this result.  See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).  In 
Blaisdell, the lenders argued that a Minnesota law providing an extension of time for 
borrowers to repay their loans and preventing lenders from foreclosing on the property 
violated the Contracts Clause by interfering with their private rights to their property.  Id. at 
416–17.  Central to the case was the state’s argument that its action was a valid exercise of its 
powers given the severe economic climate.  Id. at 420.  The Supreme Court upheld the actions 
of the Minnesota legislature.  Id. at 448. 
 60. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 62. DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 75 (1998). 
 63. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). 
 64. Id. at 583. 
228 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 12, No. 2 
 
2. A New Standard for Economic Legislation 
 
The 1938 decision of the Supreme Court in Welch v. Henry65 illustrates 
the increased leniency of the Court and an acceptance of retroactive actions 
as long as such action was not arbitrary or oppressive.  In Welch, the state of 
Wisconsin adopted a tax measure in 1935 that would retroactively disallow 
deductions for corporate dividends received by taxpayers as of 1933.66  In 
striking down the taxpayer’s argument that such retroactive taxation violated 
due process, the Court made clear that the taxpayers must bear the economic 
burdens of government: 
 
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a 
liability which he assumes by contract.  It is but a way of 
apportioning the cost of government among those who in 
some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must 
bear its burdens.67 
 
A more recent example of the application of this standard of review in a 
due process challenge to a retroactive action is Pension Benefits Guarantee 
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,68 in which “the Supreme Court suggested [that] 
courts that analyze legislation affecting the distribution of retirement benefits 
should employ rational basis review.”69  According to the Court in PBCG, 
“the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that 
the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”70 
This is not to suggest that retroactive application is always permissible.  
As Justice O’Connor explained in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,71  
 
   Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic 
legislation, including the power to affect contractual 
commitments between private parties.  Congress also 
may impose retroactive liability to some degree, 
particularly where it is “confined to short and limited 
periods required by the practicalities of producing 
national legislation.”  Our decisions, however, have left 
                                                
 65. 305 U.S. 134 (1938). 
 66. Id. at 141. 
 67. Id. at 146. 
 68. 467 U.S. 717 (1984). 
 69. Gavin Reinke, When a Promise Isn’t a Promise: Public Employers’ Ability to Alter 
Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1687 (2011).  
 70. PBCG, 467 U.S. at 729. 
 71. 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
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open the possibility that legislation might be 
unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability 
on a limited class of parties that could not have 
anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is 
substantially disproportionate to the parties’ 
experience.72  
 
     Part IV will explore the constitutionality of retroactive actions in the tax 
arena. 
 
IV.  RETROACTIVE TAXATION TAKES MANY FORMS 
 
Despite the skepticism and distrust of legal actions with a retroactive 
effect, retroactive actions in the area of taxation have a long history of 
withstanding constitutional challenges.  Some of the means by which 
retroactive actions have been taken against often unsuspecting taxpayers 
include: (1) a retroactive tax rate increase; (2) a retroactive imposition of 
taxes; and (3) prospective-only application of a judicial decision declaring a 
law unconstitutional.73 
In most cases, the Court has upheld retroactive taxation as long as the 
retroactive action was not arbitrary and the period of retroactivity was not 
excessively long.74  In other cases, the Court has simply required that the 
retroactive changes further a “rational legislative purpose.”75  The lowering 
                                                
 72. Id. at 528–29 (internal citation omitted). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 300 (1981) (per curiam) 
(upholding the retroactive increase in the minimum tax rate applied to federal taxable income); 
United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501 (1937) (upholding the retroactive imposition of a 
new tax on profits derived from the sale of silver); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, No. 289781, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 71 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2010) (upholding 
the Michigan legislature’s right to retroactively amend a statute in order to prevent the 
payment of refund claims that would otherwise have been due based on a previous judicial 
decision). 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 27 (1994). 
 75. See, e.g., Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1334 (2002) (emphasis added).  When 
Congress enacted the Roth IRA (effective January 1, 1998), it allowed taxpayers to roll their 
existing IRA accounts into a Roth IRA.  Id. at 1331.  However, what the statute failed to do 
was to include a ten percent penalty on early withdrawal from the Roth of funds transferred 
from the IRA.  Id. at 1331–32.  When Congress discovered the error in July 1998, it enacted a 
legislative fix retroactive to January 1, 1998.  Id. at 1332.  As a result of this new legislation, 
the plaintiffs in Kitt were required to pay a ten percent withdrawal penalty on the withdrawal 
from their IRA.  Id.  The Court explained: “[T]he validity of a retroactive tax provision under 
the Due Process clause depends upon whether . . . [such application] is itself justified by a 
rational legislative purpose. . . . We conclude that the retroactive application of the ten percent 
additional tax to Kitt’s transaction served a rational legislative purpose and therefore is 
consistent with the Due Process Clause.”  Id. at 1334. 
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of the bar on retroactive tax actions, combined with a troubled economic 
climate in which states seek to adapt as many means as possible to fund local 
financial needs, has resulted in continued retroactive grabs on taxpayers’ 
income.  As noted by one commentator: 
 
Remedy litigation appears to be increasing today, and that 
trend may be expected to continue as states toy with 
applying judicial decisions on a prospective basis only, 
enacting legislation that retroactively revokes a taxpayer’s 
refund claims, or reversing a long-standing administrative 
ruling to retroactively impose tax.  Thus the questions now 
being litigated include whether a state may remove the right 
to a refund after a taxpayer has already paid and whether a 
state may impose a tax retroactively.76 
 
A. Retroactive Tax Rate Increases 
 
The idea of a retroactive tax increase is not a new one.  There have been 
several federal retroactive tax rate increases beginning with the Revenue Act 
of 1918, which retroactively increased individual and corporate rates to the 
start of 1918.77  Another example is the Revenue Act of 1936, which 
retroactively increased the top individual rate to seventy-nine percent from 
sixty-three percent.78  This was later followed by yet another retroactive 
increase from seventy-nine percent to ninety-one percent in 1944.79  When 
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 was passed in August 1993, it raised 
the top rates for both individuals and corporations.80  The rate increase was 
subject to much criticism because Congress made the change retroactive to 
January 1 of that year.81  Although lawmakers and taxpayers alike released a 
firestorm of criticism at this retroactive application, such rate increases 
clearly passed constitutional muster. 
State legislative tax rate increases have also become increasingly 
common as states use retroactive taxes to cure budget shortfalls.  Table 1 
shows a representative list of these increases within the past five years: 
 
                                                
 76. Gregory A. Castanias et al., Retroactivity and Refunds: Can They Really Keep Your 
Money?, STATE TAX NOTES 419, 419–20 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/ 
Uploads/Images/110816-Retroactivity-Refunds-Can-They-Really-Keep-Your-Money.pdf. 
 77. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919). 
 78. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648 (1936). 
 79. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 10, 58 Stat. 231 (1944). 
 80. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416. 
 81. Id. 
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                  Table 1. 
     Retroactive Legislative Tax Rate Increases82 
 
State Increase83 
California  0.25% increase in each tax bracket 
Connecticut  Increased marginal rates from three (3%, 5%, and 6.5%) to six (3%, 5%, 5.5%, 6%, 6.5%, and 6.75%)84 
Delaware  1% increase in top income tax rate 
Hawaii 9% increase on income over $150,000, 10% increase on income over $175,000, and 11% increase on income over $200,000 
Illinois  Staggering 67% increase in personal income tax, raising the 3% rate to 5% 
Maryland  The 5%, 5.25%, and 5.5% income levels begin at lower threshold amounts, and a new 5.75% tax bracket has been added 
New Jersey  
Temporary tax increase of 8% on incomes over $400,000, 10.25% 
on incomes over $500,000, and 10.75% on income over 
$1,000,000 
New York Temporary increase of 8.97% on incomes over $500,000 and 7.85% on income over $200,000 
Oregon  Temporary increase of 11% on incomes over $250,000 and 10.8% on incomes over $125,000 
Wisconsin  New 7.75% increase on incomes over $225,000 
 
On Election Day 2012, California joined this group of states when voters 
approved Proposition 30 and increased taxes retroactively to January 1, 
2012.85  Taxpayers are approving retroactive taxes at the ballot box. 
 
B. Retroactive Imposition of Taxes: Wholly New Tax v. Clarification? 
 
The preliminary hurdle in analyzing the constitutionality of retroactively 
imposing a tax is determining whether the action represents the imposition of 
a “new tax law,” in which case the ability to take retroactive action may be 
more limited, or whether such action merely represents a legislative 
                                                
 82. All data contained herein has been derived from Kail Padgitt & Mark Robyn, Some 
States Respond to Budget Shortfalls with Tax Increases, TAX FOUND. (July 2009), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/some-states-respond-budget-shortfalls-tax-increases. 
 83. In the interest of simplicity, the only rate increases incuded here are those applicable to 
single filers. 
 84. Rute Pinho, Retroactive Income Tax Increases, OLR RES. REP. (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0021.htm. 
 85. Ashlea Ebeling, California Voters Sock it to the Rich (and the Fate of Other State Tax 
Ballot Measures), FORBES (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ashleaebeling/2012/11/08/california-voters-sock-it-to-the-rich-and-the-fate-of-other-state-tax-
ballot-measures/. 
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clarification of existing law, in which case the legislature is given wide 
latitude to retroactively issue a clarification of legislative intent.86  
Distinguishing between the two is not without controversy.  “There is, to be 
sure, a gray area between cases that have clearly approved two years of tax 
retroactivity and cases that have barely struck down decades of non-tax 
retroactivity.”87 
 
1. Historical Development 
 
As early as 1874, the Supreme Court in Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance 
Co.88 upheld a retroactive tax on corporations on dividends declared.89  This 
tax was enacted in 1870, but applied to earnings accrued in 1869.90  
Taxpayers challenged the tax on the ground that its retroactive application 
violated their rights to due process.91  In striking down the due process 
challenge to the tax, the Court explained: 
  
The right of Congress to have imposed this tax by a new 
statute, although the measure of it was governed by the 
income of the past year, cannot be doubted; much less can 
it be doubted that it could impose such a tax on the income 
of the current year, though part of that year had elapsed 
when the statute was passed.92  
 
Then, for a brief period in the early 1900s, the Court struck down the 
retroactive application of the newly enacted gift taxes as a violation of due 
process, finding that the taxpayer's lack of notice as to future new tax laws 
would make the application of those laws “arbitrary and capricious.”93  
Nichols v. Coolidge94 involved the application of section 402(c) of a Revenue 
Act passed on February 24, 1919.95  This Act required the estate of Mrs. Julia 
Coolidge to include the gross value of property that the decedent had already 
transferred to her children several years before her death because the actual 
                                                
 86. ERIKA LUNDER ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R42791, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
RETROACTIVE TAX LEGISLATION 4 (2012). 
 87. James M. Puckett, Embracing the Queen of Hearts: Deference to Retroactive Tax 
Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 349, 383 (2013). 
 88. 87 U.S. 323 (1873). 
 89. Id. at 333. 
 90. Id. at 326. 
 91. Id. at 328. 
 92. Id. at 331. 
 93. See Haskins, supra note 53, at 1165. 
 94. 274 U.S. 531 (1927). 
 95. Id. at 532. 
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conveyance of the property did not occur until her death in January 1921.96  
According to the Court, the retroactive application of the tax was “arbitrary, 
capricious[,] and amount[ed] to confiscation”97 in violation of the Due 
Process Clause.  Of particular significance in this case was the fact that this 
was considered a wholly new tax.98 
In Blodgett v. Holden,99 the plaintiff transferred inter vivos gifts valued at 
$850,000 in January 1924 before the June 2 passage of the Estate Tax as 
section 319 of the Revenue Act of 1924.100  The record in the case indicated 
that the gift tax provisions did not come before Congress for consideration 
until February 25 of that year, so there was no notice to the taxpayer that 
imposition of the gift tax could be imminent.101  The Court therefore found 
the retroactive imposition of the gift tax to be arbitrary and invalid.102 
The facts of Untermyer v. Anderson103 are similar to those of Blodgett 
except that Untermyer’s gifts were made on May 23, 1924, only very shortly 
before the bill at issue was signed into law.104  The Court focused on whether 
the fact that Untermyer had notice of the pending enactment of the gift tax 
was sufficient to distinguish the case from Blodgett and allow the taxation to 
stand.105  Finding that it did not, the Court ruled that the application of the tax 
to Untermyer’s gifts was an arbitrary action in violation of due process since 
Untermyer, at the time of the gift, did not have notice that the transaction 
would be subject to tax.106  Blodgett and Untermyer both advance the 
“wholly new tax” argument, and illustrate the Supreme Court’s agreement 
that “imposition of the tax retroactively would be unreasonable considering 
that the taxpayers had no notice when the gifts where [sic] made that they 
may be subject to tax in the future.”107  By the 1930s, the Court began to shift 
away from the requirement of actual notice for taxpayers and instead focused 
on whether the retroactive application of legislation was harsh or 
oppressive.108   
                                                
 96. Id. at 533. 
 97. Id. at 543. 
 98. Id. at 540–41. 
 99. 275 U.S. 142 (1927). 
 100. Id. at 146. 
 101. Id. at 146–47. 
 102. Id. at 147. 
 103. 276 U.S. 440 (1928). 
 104. Id. at 444–45. 
 105. Id. at 445. 
 106. Id. at 444–45. 
 107. The Likelihood and Enforceability of a Retroactive Tax, ASSET PROT. SOC’Y (2002), 
http://www.assetprotectionsociety.org/the-likelihood-and-enforceability-of-a-retroactive-tax-2/ 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
 108. See Haskins, supra note 53, at 1166. 
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In 1931, the Court decided the case of Milliken v. United States.109  
There, the Court sanctioned the retroactive taxation of a decedent’s gifts—
which he had made in contemplation of death in 1916—at the increased rate 
that had gone into effect in 1918.110  The Court found that this situation did 
not represent the imposition of a wholly new tax as it had in the earlier cases, 
and therefore the taxpayer was not without notice.111  In analyzing the 
Court’s various approaches in these early estate tax cases, Ralph Neuhoff 
sees the common element in the decisions to be one of fairness, in that the 
Court will only permit retroactive application when a taxpayer could have 
reasonably foreseen such an outcome.112 
 
2. The Carlton Standard 
 
The most recent Supreme Court case on retroactive tax legislation is 
United States v. Carlton,113 decided by the Court in 1994.  At issue in that 
case was an estate tax deduction permitted by Internal Revenue Code section 
2057.114  This deduction, which went into effect in October 1986, allowed an 
estate to deduct one-half of the sale price of employer securities that the 
estate sold to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).115  In reliance on 
this provision, Carlton, acting as executor of the estate of Willametta Day, 
purchased 1.5 million shares of MCI Communications Corporation stock for 
$11,206,000.116  Two days later, Carlton resold this stock to the MCI ESOP 
for $10,575,000, resulting in a loss of $631,000.117  Carlton then took the 
deduction for one-half of the sales price ($5,287,000) on the estate return.118  
In January 1987, the IRS announced that it would only allow such a 
deduction for stock that was owned by a decedent before his or her death 
and, therefore, denied the claimed deduction for the Day estate.119  In 
December 1987, Congress enacted legislation supporting the IRS’s 
conclusion that such a deduction would only be available for stock owned by 
a decedent before death.120  Carlton paid the deficiency plus interest and then 
                                                
 109. 283 U.S. 15 (1931). 
 110. Id. at 18–19. 
 111. Id. at 23. 
 112. See Ralph Neuhoff, Retrospective Tax Laws, 21 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 1 (1935). 
 113. 512 U.S. 26. 
 114. Id. at 28. 
 115. Id. at 31. 
 116. Id. at 28. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29. 
 120. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10411(a), 101 Stat. 1330-432.  The 
statute (as amended) provided that, to qualify for the estate tax deduction, the securities sold to 
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filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 
claiming that the retroactive applications of the 1987 amendments to Code 
section 2057 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.121  
The District Court disagreed and awarded summary judgment to the United 
States.122  A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the District Court.123  The majority considered two major factors in 
reaching its decision: (1) whether the taxpayer relied on prior law to his 
detriment; and (2) whether the taxpayer had actual or constructive notice of 
the change.124 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit.125  
While acknowledging that Carlton relied on the version of Code section 2057 
in place at the time of the transaction, the Court did not find this persuasive, 
reiterating instead Justice Stone’s ruling in Welch v. Henry that “Tax 
legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal 
Revenue Code.”126  Further, the Court did not find Carlton’s lack of notice 
dispositive, citing to its decision in Milliken that a taxpayer “should be 
regarded as taking his chances of any increase in the tax burden which might 
result from carrying out the established policy of taxation.”127  The Court 
instead found the following factors compelling: (1) the purpose of the 
retroactive amendment was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary; and (2) 
Congress acted promptly and therefore the retroactivity period was 
modest.128  In this situation, Congress anticipated that without amendment, 
the loophole provided by Code section 2057 could cause a revenue loss of as 
much as $7 billion, which was twenty times greater than expected.129  Once 
Congress learned of the problem caused by the statutory language of 2057, it 
acted promptly to correct the statute and this retroactive application was a 
modest period of only slightly over one year.130  The Court cited to its 
holding in United States v. Darusmont,131 stating: 
                                                                                                               
an ESOP must have been “directly owned” by the decedent “immediately before death.”  Id. 
 121. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 29–30. 
 125. Id. at 30, 35. 
 126. Id. at 33; Welch, 305 U.S. at 146–47 (“Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the 
taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract.  It is but a way of apportioning the cost 
of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must 
bear its burdens.  Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition 
does not necessarily infringe due process . . . .”). 
 127. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34; Milliken, 283 U.S. at 23. 
 128. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 32–33. 
 131. 449 U.S. 292. 
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Congress “almost without exception” has given general 
revenue statutes effective dates prior to the dates of actual 
enactment.  This “customary congressional practice” 
generally has been “confined to short and limited periods 
required by the practicalities of producing national 
legislation.”132  
 
In separate concurrences, Justice O’Connor and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas offered additional insights.  Justice O’Connor reiterated the due 
process standard—“legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational 
means”133—while stressing that Congress has not been granted unlimited 
power to upset otherwise settled expectations.134  In her view, “A period of 
retroactivity longer than the year preceding the legislative session in which 
the law was enacted would raise . . . serious constitutional questions.”135  
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the Court’s judgment only on the 
basis that they did not find “substantive due process” to be a constitutional 
right.136  According to the Justices, if they did believe that such a right 
existed, they would dissent from the opinion, believing the amendment to be 
more than a curative measure, referring to it instead as “bait-and-switch 
taxation.”137 
 
3. Post-Carlton Development 
 
In September 2012, the Supreme Court of New York upheld legislation 
enacted in 2010 to modify the tax rules for a non-resident S Corporation 
shareholder making a section 338(h)(10) election.138  Essentially, New York 
wanted to ensure that non-residents would be subject to New York tax on the 
deemed sale of their assets.139  The most striking feature of the retroactive 
legislation was the effective date.  Enacted in 2010, it was effective 
retroactively to January 1, 2007.140  The taxpayer at issue in the dispute 
                                                
 132. Id. at 296–97; Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32–33. 
 133. 512 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 134. Id. at 37. 
 135. Id. at 38. 
 136. Id. at 39 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Caprio v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 955 N.Y.S. 2d 734, 747 
(2012).  The purpose of making such an election is to treat a stock purchase as an asset 
purchase for taxation purposes. 
 139. Id. at 740.  Existing legislation as interpreted by court decisions did not subject this 
transaction to tax for a non-New York resident. 
 140. Id. 
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challenged the constitutionality of the retroactivity in court.141  Relying on 
both federal and New York cases that have permitted retroactive legislation, 
the court upheld the tax, finding that a retroactive tax should be upheld 
“unless it reaches so far into the past or so unfairly as to constitute a 
deprivation of property without due process.”142  Also expressing concern 
with whether the retroactive legislation was harsh and oppressive, the court 
noted that this is a “question of degree, requiring a balancing of the 
equities.”143 
 
4. Administrative Retroactive Changes 
 
Another aspect of this discussion is to what extent agencies, such as the 
Internal Revenue Service, have authority to engage in retroactive rulemaking.  
As pointed out by Chris Schmitter, administrative authority has become 
increasingly important, especially given the increasing amount of pressure on 
agencies to address the administrative aspects of new laws, such as the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street reform bill.144  One thing is clear: if the agency is engaged in 
rulemaking, its ability to do so retroactively is limited.145  If, instead, the 
retroactive rules are merely interpretive, they are more likely to pass muster, 
since interpretive rules are designed to clarify what the law has always 
meant, not establish new rules.146  One approach taken by the IRS in recent 
years has been especially troubling.  In a number of cases, the IRS has taken 
the position that it has administrative authority to invalidate decided cases 
through retroactive interpretive regulations.147  These actions give “further 
                                                
 141. Id. at 742. 
 142. Id. at 743. 
 143. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 144. Chris Schmitter, Going Back in Time: The Search for Retroactive Rulemaking Power 
in Statutory Deadlines, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1114, 1115 (2013). 
 145. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Weien, Note, Retroactive Rulemaking, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 749, 756–57 (2007) (discussing the tendency of courts to cite the principle of fair notice 
as a reason for barring retroactive rulemaking).  For a thorough treatment of an agency’s 
ability to engage in retroactive rulemaking when the agency is given a specific deadline by 
Congress in which to act and fails to meet that deadline, see generally Schmitter, supra note 
144. 
 146. See, e.g., Puckett, supra note 87, at 367. 
 147. See, e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 10-1204, 2012 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 11811 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2012).  In Intermountain, the D.C. Circuit found that 
the IRS had the ability to issue regulations that interpreted the law in such a way that the 
regulations effectively overruled a recent decision by the Tax Court on the contested Code 
provisions.  At issue was whether an overstatement of basis was an omission of income under 
Code sections 6501(e) and 6229 for purposes of extending the normal three-year statute of 
limitations to six years.  On September 1, 2009, the Tax Court ruled that it was not.  On 
September 28 of that same year, the IRS issued two temporary interpretive regulations that 
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credence to claims that the agency and the Treasury Department . . . are 
pushing the boundaries of their regulatory powers to an extent never before 
seen.”148  For the time being, however, that position has been unable to 
advance.  In April 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that IRS regulations will 
not be given deference in situations in which the Court has already decided 
that Congressional intent is clear and there is no ambiguity for the 
regulations to resolve.149 
 
C. Application of a Statute That Has Been Declared Unconstitutional 
 
Taxing measures that run afoul of constitutional limitations, and are 
struck down on judicial challenge, bring up the question of what remedies are 
available to taxpayers who have paid an unconstitutional tax.  Answering this 
question necessitates a determination of whether the decision will be applied 
prospectively or retroactively.  Retroactive application is the general rule and 
would allow those who had been required to pay an unconstitutional tax a 
right to a refund of such taxes.150  However, recognizing that such application 
could leave states financially vulnerable and that numerous refund claims 
could detrimentally affect a state’s financial stability, courts have allowed the 
states flexibility in crafting taxpayer relief.  As the Court in McKesson Corp. 
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco made clear, there are a variety 
of approaches available to the taxing authority, and while a state must 
provide a taxpayer with meaningful relief, a state may consider the impact of 
any refunds on state financial stability: 
 
We agree that, within our due process jurisprudence, state 
interests traditionally have played, and may play, some role 
in shaping the contours of the relief that the state must 
provide to illegally or erroneously deprived taxpayers . . . . 
States have a legitimate interest in sound fiscal planning and 
. . . this interest is sufficiently weighty to allow States to 
withhold predeprivation relief for allegedly unlawful tax 
assessments, providing postdeprivation relief only.151 
 
                                                                                                               
said that this would be an omission of gross income.  Relying on Code section 7805(b), which 
gives the IRS authority to issue regulations with retroactive effect, the IRS imposed the 
regulations retroactively. 
 148. Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretive Treasury Regulations, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558, 1559 (2011). 
 149. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012). 
 150. McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (2011). 
 151. Id. at 50. 
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In addition to the California cases described in Part I, in a series of recent 
cases in other states, state legislatures have taken retroactive actions either to 
eliminate or to diminish pending taxpayer refund claims.  In most of these 
cases, Supreme Court review was requested and certiorari was denied. 
In Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp.,152 the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky considered whether the due process clause was violated when state 
legislation was retroactively applied to taxpayer refund claims to deny 
taxpayer’s interest on pending claims.153  In that case, the taxpayer 
corporations filed tax returns in Kentucky, which were later amended seeking 
a refund of an overpayment along with corresponding interest.154  While the 
refund claims were pending, the Kentucky legislature passed retroactive 
legislation that potentially shortened the period for which a taxpayer could 
accrue interest on overpayments and also decreased the rate of that 
interest.155  The taxpayer argued that such action violated due process, but the 
court found that it did not because it furthered a legitimate governmental 
purpose of raising revenue in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Carlton.156  The taxpayers sought Supreme Court review, but this was 
denied.157 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Department of Treasury158 involved actions of 
the Michigan legislature that retroactively amended the meaning of the term 
“persons.”159  This amendment resulted in a denial of pending refund claims 
filed by the Ford Motor Company seeking a refund resulting from a bad debt 
deduction.160  The Court of Appeals of Michigan ruled that the retroactive 
action of the legislature was a clarification of legislative intent.161  According 
to the court, “Once the intention of the legislature is discovered, it prevails 
over any conflicting rule of statutory construction.”162  The Supreme Court 
also denied certiorari in this case.163 
The center of the dispute in Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc.164 was the 
ability of corporations to file consolidated returns under the unitary business 
                                                
 152. Nos. 2007-CA-002549-MR & 2008-CA-000023-MR, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 229 (Ky. 
App. Nov. 20, 2009). 
 153. Id. at *20. 
 154. Id. at *3–4. 
 155. Id. at *19. 
 156. Id. at *21. 
 157. Id., cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1720 (2011). 
 158. 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 5088. 
 159. Brief for Respondent at 5, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 131 S. Ct. 1000 
(2011) (No. 10-481). 
 160. Id. at 5–6. 
 161. Ford, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 71, at *1–2. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id., cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1000 (2011). 
 164. 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009). 
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principle.165  The corporate taxpayers in that case had originally filed 
separate returns, but a 1994 ruling by the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
authorized consolidated return filings for unitary businesses.166  As a result of 
that ruling, taxpayers filed amended consolidated returns seeking a refund of 
overpaid tax.167  Recognizing that the court’s ruling would result in a barrage 
of amended consolidated return filings seeking a refund, the Kentucky 
legislature retroactively modified the statute to bar the filing of this type of 
consolidated return and also to bar the payment of any refunds due on this 
type of amended return.168  The court upheld the retroactive amendments 
made in 1996 and 2000 as an exercise of the state’s revenue-raising function 
that served a legitimate government purpose.169  The lone dissent in the case 
had this to say: 
 
This corporate tax case presents a rather straightforward 
question: how aggressively may the General Assembly 
legislate after-the-fact in an effort to retain tax monies which 
this court has held were collected in contravention of state 
law? . . . Generally, a sovereign must provide “meaningful 
relief” in the form of a refund of the invalidly collected taxes 
and, while there is some latitude to legislate tax law 
retroactively, that power must be exercised promptly for a 
legitimate purpose and for a modest period.  The 2000 
Kentucky General Assembly exceeded the bounds of due 
process when it passed H.B. 541 in an effort to undo entirely 
this Court’s ruling over five years earlier . . . . Neither the 
complete ban of all outstanding tax refund claims associated 
with the . . . case nor the retroactive rewrite of state tax law 
to condone the retention of corporate taxes invalidly 
collected five to twelve years previously passes 
constitutional muster.170 
 




                                                
 165. Id. at 393. 
 166. Id. at 394. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 397. 
 170. Miller, 296 S.W.3d at 407 (Abramson, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id., cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010). 
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A more recent case to note is General Motors Corp. v. Department of the 
Treasury,172 in which the court gave Michigan wide latitude to enact 
retroactive legislation that denied the taxpayer a refund of overpaid taxes.173  
The Michigan Department of Treasury required General Motors (GM) to pay 
use taxes on vehicles that it purchased for its employees to use as 
demonstration vehicles.174  GM paid such taxes for many years, until a 
decision by the Michigan Supreme Court175 determined that cars purchased 
as demos were exempt from the use tax under the sale for resale 
exemption.176  While that case was pending, GM filed a refund claim, in 
August 2006, seeking a refund of approximately $65 million for the period of 
1996 through March 2002.177  The court issued its decision in May 2007.178  
In September 2007, GM filed a second refund claim seeking approximately 
$51 million for the period of March 2002 though August 2007.179  In the 
interim, the state was concerned by estimates that the court’s decision carried 
a potential one time cost to the state of $250 million and ongoing costs of 
$29.2 million.180  In June 2007, Michigan state lawmakers introduced House 
Bill 4882 into law, which retroactively modified the use tax law to clarify 
that purchases of demo vehicles such as those paid by GM would remain 
subject to taxation.181  This proposed legislation became law in October 2007 
and the legislature decreed that it would have retroactive effect dating back 
five years to 2002 and beyond to the extent a statute of limitations period 
remained open for a taxpayer.182  In effect, the legislation retroactively 
prohibited GM’s refund claims.  The Appeals Court of Michigan, relying 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carlton, determined that this 
action by the Michigan legislature did not violate GM’s due process rights.183  
The court explained: 
 
A legislature’s action to mend a leak in the public treasury or 
tax revenue—whether created by poor drafting of legislation 
in the first instance or by a judicial decision—with 
retroactive legislation has almost universally been 
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recognized as “rationally related to a legitimate legislative 
purpose.”184  
 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case in 2012, allowing the state 
court’s approval of a five-year retroactivity period to stand.185 
Commenting on the ability of state legislatures to pass legislation to 
make clarifications to the law as a result of an unfavorable judicial outcome, 
Robert Gunning has observed: 
 
If the legislative branch believes that the taxpayers may 
succeed and open the doors to refund claims for other 
taxpayers, it should act promptly to rectify any perceived 
defects in the legislation, rather than await the result of the 
litigation and then attempt to retroactively slam the door on 
taxpayer refund claims.186 
 
The Supreme Court’s repeated refusal to grant certiorari in cases challenging 
state retroactive takings will no doubt help to perpetuate the ever-lengthening 




“The Great Recession that began in December 2007 has made for 
difficult times for American state and local governments, as with most all 
entities and individuals.”187  The landscape of retroactive revenue grabs is 
vast and no doubt fueled, in part, by state financial needs.  In the absence of 
an express constitutional provision prohibiting retroactive actions, the 
question remains whether there are any limits on the extent to which 
taxpayers can be expected to incur retroactive costs.  Supreme Court 
decisions on retroactive actions go back almost as far as the start of our 
nation’s history, and yet provide no sense of clarity that will help taxpayers 
to plan for or guard against a retroactive taking.  The Supreme Court has 
consistently broadened its acceptance of retroactive actions in the area of 
taxation.  Although early cases sometimes looked to whether taxpayers had 
adequate notice of a change or whether the retroactivity period was short 
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(generally within one year), this approach has gradually given way to a more 
lenient standard.  The driving factor in recent cases tends to be the Carlton 
Court’s rational basis standard, a low standard of judicial scrutiny.188  The 
generally accepted one-year standard has given way to cases that condone 
two-, three-, and even five-year retroactivity periods, although no bright line 
test has emerged.  The United States Supreme Court seems content to sit on 
the sidelines as due process rights are increasingly stripped away. 
       At present there remains no litmus test for assessing the constitutionality 
of a retroactive revenue grab.  “There is much play in the joints between two 
years’ retroactivity and two decades’ retroactivity that the Court’s precedents 
do not squarely address.  [As] Justice Scalia observes, . . . the reasoning the 
court applies [in Carlton] to uphold the statute in this case guarantees thatall 
[sic] retroactive laws will henceforth be valid.”189  While this is certainly an 
exaggeration by Justice Scalia, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court’s 
adoption of the rational basis standard of review in such cases and the 
Court’s failure to clearly define a “modest period of retroactivity”190 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that for taxpayers facing retroactive 
changes that result in additional tax liabilities or the denial of refund claims, 
relief is nowhere in sight.  California’s “lawless taxation” and “midnight 
special” are only a glimpse of what is yet to come. 
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